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Abstract A small number of offenders are responsible for a disproportionate share of
total crime. Policy makers have been seeking to reduce crime more efficiently by targeting
corrections at these frequent offenders. Thus far, both macro- and micro-level research
have yielded mixed results regarding the effects of these kinds of selective policies. The
current study uses data from the Netherlands Criminal Career and Life-course Study to
estimate the incapacitative effects of alternative selective prison policies. Using the rolling
cohorts method, implementations of various penal scenarios differing in selection rate,
sentence disparity and selective accuracy are simulated. Results show that it is hard for
selective policies to yield a positive societal result: costs of imprisonment typically exceed
benefits gained from crimes prevented.
Keywords Selective incapacitation  Frequent offenders  Rolling-cohorts 
Cost-benefit analysis
Introduction
Imprisonment aims to reduce crimes in three ways (Blumstein et al. 1978): general
deterrence, specific deterrence and incapaciation. This study deals with this last, incapa-
citative effect of imprisonment. In particular it focuses on the effects of selective inca-
pacitation, that is, imprisonment policies specifically targeting some predefined group of
offenders.
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Selective incapacitation policies are increasingly being implemented, both in the U.S.
and in Europe. The rationale behind these policies is straightforward: reducing crime at
lower cost. The more skewed the distribution of offence frequency in the offender popu-
lation, the more offenses can be prevented by selectively incapacitating those offenders
that are at the high end of this distribution. If frequent offenders are also more serious and
violent offenders, as both theory (e.g. Moffitt 1993, 2006) and empirical research suggests
(Piquero 2000a, b; Tracy et al. 1990; Wolfgang et al. 1972), the benefits of removing these
offenders from society may be even greater (Piper 1985). Selective incapacitation however
is not uncontroversial. Ethical objections have been raised to the sanction disparity
inherent to these selective policies (e.g. Moore 1986). Others have stressed the ‘stochastic’
selectiveness that is already built-in to the judicial system, predicting low yields of an
additional focus on frequent offenders (Blumstein et al. 1993; Canela-Cacho et al. 1997).
Finally, researchers have pointed to the rising prison costs (Donohue III and Siegelman
1998), wastage of prison capacity (Blumstein 2005), the costly care of the aging prison
population (King and Mauer 2001; Shichor and Sechrest 1996; Walker 2001), possible
problems in monitoring growing groups of inmates serving long-term sentences, and the
growing number of appeals lodged by those offenders meeting the selective criteria that
may result from selective policies (Austin and Irwin 2001; Cushman 1996; Flanagan et al.
1998; Patch 1998).
Research into the effects of incapacitation has either been at a macro-level, combining
aggregate data on prison populations and crime rates, or at the micro-level using models
combining information on individual offence rates, probability of conviction and sentence
length. Aggregate research is faced with the problem of separating the effect of impris-
onment on crime from the effect crime has on imprisonment. See Piquero and Blumstein
(this issue) and Miles and Ludwig (this issue) for reviews. Additionally, this type of
research can only address the combined deterrent and incapacitative effects of imprison-
ment. Micro-level research does focus solely on imprisonment’s incapacatative effect, but
finds that outcomes vary widely depending on the estimates of the various criminal career
characteristics used. Also, thus far these latter studies pertain to adult offenders only.
Finally, extant research has been primarily based on North-American data; different
conclusions may follow from using data from countries that differ from the U.S. in crime
rates, offender characteristics and penal culture.
Our aim in this study is to examine the effects of various selective incapacitation
policies in the Netherlands. We do this by simulating the effects of various hypothetical
selective scenarios, varying in both selection rate and disparity ratio using data from the
Criminal Career and Life-course Study, a longitudinal study of a Dutch conviction cohort
followed up to age 72.
Earlier Research on Incapacitation and Crime
Macro-level Studies
Studies into the effects of imprisonment on crime have used one of two approaches: macro-
and micro-level studies. Macro-level or, as Spelman (2000a) refers to them, top-down
studies have relied on aggregate data on society-level crime rates and prison populations.
These studies typically estimate the relation between crime rates and prison populations,
whilst controlling for other variables that may affect crimes rates like the population’s age
distribution or its unemployment rate using multivariate regression techniques. In doing so,
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macro-level studies are unable to separate incapacitation effects from deterrence effects.
Depending on the level of aggregation, these studies have yielded effects ranging from zero
to a 2.2% decrease in crime resulting from a 1% increase in the incarceration rate (see:
Spelman 2000b; Stemen 2007 for reviews). Nation-level studies have produced the largest
effect sizes, but have trouble with dealing with the biasing effects of long-term social
trends (Spelman 2000a). U.S. state-level studies have found more modest—and arguably
more realistic—effect sizes (0.06 to 0.40). Yet, many of these studies did not control
for simultaneity, that is, the fact that while prison rates may affect crime rates, crime rates
in reverse may affect prison rates. If the increase in prison population is caused by an
increase in crime rates, this will downplay the results of imprisonment and may—when
worst comes to worst—even make it look like increasing imprisonment increases crime
rates. Today only three studies have accounted for simultaneity. Both Levitt (1996) and
Spelman (2000a) made comparisons between 50 U.S. states, Spelman (2005) compared
Texas counties. These latter studies yield elasticity estimates from 0.26 to 0.44, with
somewhat larger effects for violent compared to property crimes. Due to their design, the
effects from these macro-level models typically pertain to the combined deterrent and
incapacitative effects of imprisonment.
Instead of analyzing long-term trends, other researchers using aggregate data have
specifically focused on the implementation of selective policies, most often the ‘three
strikes’ laws (Clark et al. 1997; Vitiello 1997; Zimring et al. 2001). As with the studies on
imprisonment in general cited above, many of the studies into selective imprisonment did
not control for simultaneity. This may lead effects of these selective policies to be
underestimated, since outcome measures may also be affected by pre-existing increasing
crime trends that gave rise to implementing the selective policy in the first place. Many
studies also have a short follow-up period. However, as Kovandzic (2001) notes, the
incapacitative effects of selective policies most probably do not occur for many years after
the policy is implemented, since most offenders selectively imprisoned under the new
policy, would have been imprisoned for at least some period even under prevailing non-
selective policy. Using long-term data from Florida, Kovandzic (2001) finds little evidence
for a general deterrent effect of Florida’s habitual offender laws on crime, and concludes
that its limited effects on crime are mostly due to incapacitation.
It must be noted however, that while policy shifts on imprisonment in the U.S. have
been both quick and dramatic, these data are far from experimental (Spelman 2000a).
Decisions to expand imprisonment or to implement a selective policy did not occur ran-
domly, and therefore results of these changing conditions are confounded with existing
between-state differences in crime trends and prison rates and all other factors that may
have influenced either one of these variables. Results, even of the most complex models,
are therefore still potentially subject to bias.
Micro-level Studies
Instead of relying on aggregate data, micro-level, or bottom-up studies try to model the
workings of the criminal justice system in more detail. Making estimates of the offense rate
per year, the probability of arrest and conviction, and the average sentence length, these
studies calculate the proportion of his/her criminal career the typical offender will spend
imprisoned (Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar 1973; Cohen 1978, Greenwood and Abrahamse 1982).
This proportion then represents the benefits of imprisonment in terms of decreased crime
rates. Unlike most aggregate studies, these micro-level studies focus solely on the
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incapacitative effect of imprisonment. Recent studies by DiIulio and Piehl (1991), Spelman
(1994) and Piehl and DiIulio (1995) have yielded elasticity estimates ranging from 0.16
to 0.26. However, recognizing the still limited precision of the estimates used, Spelman
(2005) concludes that it is more reasonable to expect a 0.1–0.3% decrease in crime for a
1% prison expansion. Micro-level studies necessarily make assumptions about several
criminal career characteristics. Small—and plausible—changes have been demonstrated to
considerably affect the studies’ outcomes (Spelman 1994). While over the years these
studies have gained validity, as a result of more detailed data on criminal career becoming
available, they still need to rely on simplifications regarding the distribution and interre-
lationships of the various criminal career dimensions (Spelman 1994: 110).
In an effort to circumvent uncertainties and simplifications tied to the use of criminal
career estimates, Bernard and Ritti (1991) designed a rolling cohort methodology that
allowed them to estimate the incapacitative effect of selective policies using actually
observed data. Their analyses were based on count data from the Philadelphia birth cohort.
In brief, they simulated the implementation of some hypothetical selective policy and then
counted the actual number and type of offences recorded after the youth had been inca-
pacitated under the hypothetical policy. These offenses would make up the incapacitative
effect of the selective policy since they would not have occurred under the selective policy,
but actually did occur under existing, non-selective policy. Based on only the ‘chronic’
offenders in the Philadelphia cohort (those offenders who accumulated at least five police
reports) a selective policy which entailed imprisoning a youth after his second arrest until
his 18th birthday resulted in a 25% decrease in all reported crimes and a 35% decrease in
the serious crimes reported for this cohort. A similar study using Swedish birth cohort data
showed that imprisoning every recidivist in this cohort for a period of 2 years would reduce
registered crime for this cohort by 28% (Andersson 1993). However, while both studies
found that selective incapacitation would reduce crime, both studies also showed imple-
mentation of a selective policy would markedly inflate prison populations by as much as 22
times the rate under non-selective policy.
Aims of This Study
As just shown, extant research on selective incapacitation has been problematic. Given the
observational nature of the macro-level data used researchers experience difficulties in
eliminating the biases caused by possible confounding factors. Micro-level studies on the
other hand rely on estimations of several criminal career dimensions and necessarily need
to make simplifications regarding the interrelationships between these dimensions.
Therefore, estimates of the effect of selective incapacitation on crime vary widely, not in
the least part due to problems of model specification.
In addition, the far majority of studies on the incapacitative effect of selective policies
have been on U.S. data. The extent therefore to which any of these studies results would
apply to countries other than the U.S. is far from clear. This overreliance on U.S. data is
especially unfortunate, since there are many reasons why the effects of (selective) inca-
pacitation would be different in the U.S. compared to other—for example European
countries. For one, both serious violent crime rates and imprisonment rates in the U.S. are
higher in European countries. Furthermore, a relatively harsh penal climate in the U.S.,
drives up the period of selective imprisonment needed in order to effectively achieve
disparity.
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The aim of this paper is to estimate the costs and benefits associated with various forms of
selective detention policy in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has been characterized by
relatively low violent crime rates, and a lenient penal climate—at least up to 1990—resulting
in the imprisonment rate being low, comparatively few convicted offenders being sentenced
to prison, and mostly short prison sentences being imposed (Kommer 1994; Smit 2001).
Examining the effects of selective incapacitation in a Dutch context is of special interest since
the Netherlands recently began implementing selective incapacitation policies. Finally,
Dutch researchers have not previously addressed this topic and the extent to which these
newly implemented selective policies might affect crime are therefore as yet unknown.
In the current study we will address the following questions:
(1) What is the predicted decline in registered crime following the introduction of a
selective incapacitation policy, and is this decline similar across offense types?
(2) What is the predicted increase in the prison population associated with selective
incapacitation policy?
(3) On balance, what are the benefits and costs of a selective incapacitation policy?
(4) How accurate—in terms of prison wastage—are selective policies?
Estimating the Effects of (Selective) Incapacitation
The golden standard for estimating the effects of any policy would be a true randomized
experiment which would involve comparing crime rates of two societies that were—and
remained—completely similar besides the implementation of some clearly defined policy.
The conditions requisite for a controlled experiment however are very unlikely to arise,
and, even when they do arise, experiments on selective incapacitation—especially when
sentence disparity is high—would meet with serious ethical concerns. It is therefore that
researchers have turned to so called simulation studies that come closest to the experi-
mental ideal. The danger of simulation studies is that in order for the simulation to work,
researchers must make many—and often unclear—assumptions, incurring the outcomes at
risk of becoming unrealistic.
The simulation methodology designed by Bernard and Ritti (1991)—in our view—
comes close to a true experiment and its underlying assumptions are easily grasped. Their
rolling cohort method compares the actual observed number of offences for some offender
population under prevailing policy with those that would have been prevented under a
hypothetical selective policy in that same population. As a result pre-treatment conditions in
the experimental group and the control group are exactly similar, since they are in fact the
same population. Assuming a ‘steady state’ of rolling cohorts further prevents the outcome
variable to be biased due to effects of long-term social trends or temporal fluctuations
unrelated to the experimental treatment. In addition, as a result of this ‘steady state’ any
change in the outcome variable is entirely due to incapacitation. Since the rolling of the
cohorts can—in principle—go on indefinitely, this method is also well suited for examining
the long-term effects of selective incapacitation policies. Finally, the outcome variable can
be distinguished in terms of benefits—the number of actually observed offenses that would
not have occurred under selective policy—and costs—the incarceration rate that would
result from selective policy, relative to the incarceration rate under non-selective policy.
This allows for making isolated and unbiased inferences about the incapacitative effects of
the (hypothetical) selective policies proposed. It is therefore that we adopt this method in
this study. To do so, we use data from the CCLS.
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Data and Methods
Criminal Career and Life course Study (CCLS)
This study uses data from the Criminal Career and Life Course Study (CCLS) which is
being carried out at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement
(NSCR). The CCLS is a large-scale longitudinal study charting the complete criminal
careers of a large number of individuals (Nieuwbeerta and Blokland 2003). The CCLS is
based on a sample of 4% of all criminal cases in which a final ruling was pronounced by a
Dutch court or a public prosecutor in 1977 (Block and Van der Werff 1991). The CCLS
covers the entire subsequent period up to 2003 and thus contains unique prospective data
for a period of 25 years. The analyses made for this paper are based on the data of the
criminal careers of 4,615 individuals (Blokland, Nagin and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Blokland
and Nieuwbeerta 2005).1
In charting the criminal behavior of the individuals in the sample, the CCLS works with
extracts from the Criminal Records Register. These extracts record all the criminal cases
registered by the police with the Public Prosecutions Service, identify which court decided
on the case, what the decision was, whether any sentence was pronounced and if so, what
that sentence was. The CCLS—data thus pertain to cleared crime only: offenses for which
the offender was never apprehended are not considered. In order to answer the present
research questions, we have chosen to include only registrations from the extracts in
relation to a criminal offense mentioned in the Dutch Criminal Code (including the Opium
Act and the Weapons and Ammunition Act but excluding acts such as the Economic
Offenses Act and the Road Traffic Act) and that resulted in a conviction or a discretionary
dismissal. Cases that ended in an acquittal or in a dismissal because judged too weak for
conviction therefore did not count in determining a person’s criminal career, nor did
registrations of petty offenses (misdemeanors).
The Rolling Cohort Simulation Method
To estimate the consequences of the various selective policies we use the so-called ‘rolling
cohorts’ method, as introduced in the selective incapacitation literature by Bernard and
Ritti (1991). Conceptually this method closely follows the logic of a true controlled
experiment. Let us consider the important features of the method as we apply it in this
paper:
1. The rolling cohort method creates two hypothetical societies.
2. At a certain point in time (here 1977 given the nature of the data of the CCLS) a new
selective incapacitation policy is implemented in one of the societies. This is our
experimental society.
3. No new policy is implemented in the other. This is our control society.
1 To allow us to make statements about more serious offenses that occur less frequently, a number of types
of offenses were oversampled. Traffic offenses were such a frequent occurrence in 1977 that a sample of 2%
was deemed to be enough for this type of offense. Moreover, the structure of the sample was a 4% sample of
all cases, not persons. As a result, individuals who were registered for more than one case in 1977 had a
higher chance of being included in the sample than individuals who were only involved in one criminal case
that year. For these reasons, a weighting factor has been used for this paper so that the distribution of both
cases and persons in the sample is representative for the distribution in 1977. For more precise information
on the CCLS please refer to (Blokland 2005; Nieuwbeerta and Blokland 2003).
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4. The experimental society and the control society are identical (a) at the start of the
experiment, (b) during the experiment, and (c) after the experiment—on all aspects
except the implementation of the selective policy, thereby fully controlling for
simultaneity. In our case this means that—except for the implementation of the
selective incapacitation policy, both societies are and remain identical—e.g. with
respect to the characteristics of both offenders and their criminal careers and the
probability of conviction given an offence—to the Dutch situation in 1977.2
5. The treatment in the experimental society is clearly defined—and manipulated by
changing the sentence disparity of the (hypothetical) selective policy. Here: 2, 5, 10 or
20 years of imprisonment.
6. The inclusion criteria are clearly defined rendering all offenders that show pre-
described criminal history features—e.g. minimum number of convictions—liable for
selective treatment. The literature shows no consensus with regard to which offenders
should be regarded as frequent offenders; every study using its own working
definitions. In the American three-strikes legislation, the limit for frequent offenders
for example is three (and in the case of California sometimes even two) convictions for
a criminal offense. Bernard and Ritti (1991) as well as Andersson (1993) based their
calculations of selective policy effects on a classification with a limit of two
convictions (or arrests or institutionalizations in case of Bernard and Ritti). The
international criminological literature generally uses five contacts with police or
judicial authorities to define the frequent offender (Barnett and Lofaso 1985;
Blumstein et al. 1988; Kempf-Leonard et al. 2001). Since our study pertains to Dutch
data, and we want to stay close to the policy measures recently introduced in the
Netherlands, we use 3, 5 or 10 prior convictions for selection into the selective
treatment and standard prison terms of 2, 5, 10, 20 years. (Grapendaal and Tilburg
2002; Versteegh et al. 2003). This gives an adequate insight into the marginal costs
and marginal benefits of various penal scenarios under which special groups of
offenders are selectively incapacitated in the Netherlands.
7. The outcome measure is clearly defined. It consists of all convictions that are actually
observed—but would have been prevented in the experimental society. In that sense
the benefits calculated are marginal. By defining the benefits as reduction in
conviction, not in actual crimes committed, the model does not disregard the complex
dynamics underlying the evolution from actual to cleared crime, but merely assumes
these dynamics to be similar across cohorts.
8. The effects of the treatment are appropriately isolated in that the outcome measure
only represents the incapacatative effects of the selective policy. The simulation thus
does not allow for any behavioral or system effects that may follow implementation of
a selective incapacitation regime. To the degree selective policies attain greater
general and specific deterrence, a focus on just the incapacatative effects of selective
policy underestimates the benefits of these selective policies (Shepherd 2002).
However, to the extent implementation of a selective policy leads to a ‘hardening’ of
crime—offenders facing long-term incapacitation going to extremes to avoid
detection, even if for example this would mean they would have to kill for it
(Kovandzic et al. 2002; Marvell and Moody 2001; Shafer 1999)—a focus on
incapacitation may in turn overestimate selective policies ultimate benefits. The model
further assumes that others—who would not otherwise have offended—do not replace
2 Making use of the offender’s criminal history estimating the effects selective policy assumes this stability
to entail the period prior to the sampling year as well.
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the incarcerated offenders. Nor does it account for the possibility that offences
committed in groups would still have taken place even if one group member was
absent due to him or her being selectively incapacitated (Donohue III and Siegelman
1998; Mathiesen 1998; Zimring and Hawkins 1995),3 leading to further overestimation
of the policies final effects.
The Rolling Cohorts Method
Technically rolling cohorts can be implemented by creating a number of additional co-
hortst+k where k = 1 through 50 by simply adding k to each year of each offender’s criminal
history as captured in the original data-set as observed in the sampling year. For example:
an offender in the original 1977-cohort whose criminal history showed two convictions—
one in 1975 and one in 1977—will be mirrored by an offender in cohortt+1, whose con-
victions occurred in 1976 (1975 + 1) and 1978 (1977 + 1). That same offender will be
represented in cohortt+2 by an offender who was convicted in 1977 (1975 + 2) and 1979
(1977 + 2) and so on. In this way we used data on the original cohort t to create additional
cohorts up to t + 50. Under prevailing policy the assumption of rolling cohorts will lead to
a steady crime rate across k years equal to the level of crime in the sampling year. In
analyzing the benefits of selective policy this rate will serve as the base rate.
To estimate the effect of selective incapacitation on crime we then introduce selective
policy to each cohort as of 1977, say a selective policy under which each third offense
automatically leads to 2 years of imprisonment. Introducing the selective policy has the
effect of altering the number of offenders convicted in the years k = 1  50. To understand
why this is so, imagine an offender in the original cohort that had four prior convictions in
1977: two in 1975, one in 1976 and one in 1977. This offender will be mirrored by an
offender in cohortt+1 who is convicted twice in 1976, once in 1977 and once in 1978.
However, if the above mentioned selective policy was introduced in 1977, this particular
offender would not have been free to offend in yeart+1. Due to accumulating his third
conviction in 1977, this offender would have been selectively incapacitated for 2 years and
therefore unable to commit the crime or be convicted in the yeart+1. To estimate the
benefits of selectively incapacitating frequent offenders we can compare the number of
convictions in each year under the steady rate of rolling cohorts resulting from prevailing
policy with the number of convictions in years t + k150 for the additional cohorts t + k150
under selective policy.4 Given that the selective policy allows offenders to start of with a
clean slate, those offenders with long enough criminal histories—criminal histories that
extend beyond the period of selective incapacitation—may re-appear in later cohorts.
Eventually selective policy will result in a steady crime rate, but one that is below that of
non-selective policy.
To estimate the costs of selectively incapacitating frequent offenders, that is, to estimate
the growth in the prison population we can compare prison population rates in a similar
vein. Prevailing policy would lead to a steady prison population across years t + k150.
Selective incapacitation on the other hand will lead to an increase in the prison population
because every subsequent cohort new offenders will be selectively incapacitated, while
3 More technically: the model is based on person/incident combinations and not on incidents.
4 Note that we examine the effects of selective policy over and above non-selective policy, that is, offenders
not liable for selective imprisonment are assumed to be sentenced as they would have been under prevailing
non-selective policy.
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some selectively incapacitated in previous years will not yet have been released. This
growth in prison population is partly counteracted by the decreasing numbers of offenders
in each subsequent cohort free to commit crime especially in the years directly following
year t.
Finally, given the long-term prospective nature of the data used, we can also estimate
the wastage of prison capacity of the selective policies elaborated here. This is established
by simply counting the number of convictions after year t observed under prevailing non-
selective policy for those years a given offender would have been imprisoned if he would
have been subjected to a given selective incapacitation regime. Years beyond the last
conviction during which an offender would be selectively imprisoned are defined as
wasted. This approach differs from that described above in the sense that here we use
prospective data, while we use retrospective data to estimate both the decrease in registered
crime and the increase in the prison population.5
Results
Benefits: Decrease in Crime
First we focus on the possible benefits of selective policies: what will be the decline in
crime following the introduction of a selective incapacitation policy? For this we compare
the number of convictions after the introduction of a selective approach with the number of
convictions under prevailing policy. Working with rolling cohorts, the number of con-
victions under prevailing non-selective policy would remain the same as in 1977. For our
sample, this boils down to an absolute number of 3,092 criminal convictions for each
subsequent year—under a ‘steady state’—for our sample of 4,615 offenders, and 101,980
in the society given a population of 16 million inhabitants (thus assuming there is no
population growth). This is shown in Fig. 1 by means of the 0% line. Figure 1 further
shows the expected decrease in convictions under the various forms of selective policy
compared to the level under non-selective policy. Selectively incapacitating offenders who
have a fixed number of convictions to their name leads to a decrease in convictions in all
cases. With selective incapacitation, the number of convictions decreases because an
increasing percentage of offenders is imprisoned for a longer period. The big drop
immediately after introducing the selective policy is caused by offenders who already had
more than the fixed number of convictions to their name in 1977. This is because, assuming
that the policy is introduced in 1977 (year 0), crimes committed before 1977 count as well.
Surely, convictions only represent a fraction of all crimes committed. Comparing
conviction rates to registered crime rates and estimates based on victim-surveys yields
some insight in the way the number of convictions relates to number of actual crimes. For
example: in the Netherlands in 2004, the ratio of convictions is about 1 to every 16 crimes
registered by the police, and 1 to every 46 crimes reported in victim-surveys (Wittebrood
2006). Convicted offenders may very well be responsible for a considerable part of the
total number of reported victimizations. Yet, if we—for the moment—assume that
regardless of the type of offense every offender has the same risk of being registered and
convicted, the (%) drop in conviction rates also represents the attended drop in actual
crimes committed.
5 A more elaborate account of the rolling cohort method can be obtained at http://www.nscr.nl/medewer-
kers/pub/ablokland_pubE.php
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Figure 1 also shows that when the number of years after the introduction of the selective
policy is equal to the number of years of selective detention, the number of convictions
rises again. This is because, after a period of selective incapacitation, offenders are re-
leased and some of them acquire additional convictions. Ultimately the number of con-
victions stabilizes. Figure 1, for example, shows that a selective policy imprisoning
offenders for 2 years after their third conviction ultimately leads to a decrease in the
convictions of 7.5%. The analyses clearly show that the longer the period of detention, the
larger the decrease in convictions. However, each additional year of incapacitation makes a
smaller contribution to the decrease in convictions. For instance, doubling the period of
imprisonment from 10 years to 20 years only yields an additional reduction in convictions
of 3%.
Fig. 1 Estimated decrease in
registered crime under various
forms of selective policy (in %)
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The analyses further show that, a selective scenario with a high selection rate (a
selective scenario applying a broad definition of ‘frequent’ offenders) results in the largest
decline in convictions. If the selection criterion is five or ten offenses, registered crime
ultimately shows less decline than if the criterion is three convictions. This is because
fewer offenders meet these stricter criteria.
The yields of a selective policy are not only determined by the number of offenses but
also by the nature of these offenses. More detailed analyses—not presented here—show
that the decrease in convictions is not limited to one particular type of offense, but occurs
more or less equally across the board. Under most of the scenarios, the decrease in
convictions for drug-related offenses is the largest. From this it may be concluded that
drug-related offenses are committed by offenders who have a long criminal history. The
projected decrease in the number of convictions for violent offenses is small. This indicates
that frequent offenders are not more likely to be convicted for violent offenses.
Costs: Growth in Prison Population
Selective incapacitation of frequent offenders can thus cause the number of convictions
and hence crimes to decrease. But at what cost in terms of increased prison expendi-
tures? We show the estimated increase in the population of prison inmates under the
various selective scenarios in Fig. 2. To a certain extent, this development mirrors the
changes in convictions shown in Fig. 1. Here the number of offenders imprisoned each
year under non-selective policy forms the basis for the comparison. If the non-selective
policy were to be continued, then each year 142 offenders from our sample, and 6,833 in
a society of 16 million inhabitants would be imprisoned.6 This figure serves as the zero
line in Fig. 2.
The other lines in this figure show developments in the number of additional prisoners
under the various forms of selective incapacitation policy introduced in the year 0. The
rapid rise in the number of prisoners in the first years following the introduction of
selective policy results from the number of offenders who already had more than the
fixed number of convictions to their name in the year of introduction. In the first years
after introduction of the selective policy, the number of prisoners continues to rise
steadily because each year new cohorts are imprisoned before any earlier cohorts are
released. The peak in the number of prisoners always occurs in the year in which the
number of years after the introduction of the selective policy is equal to the number of
years of selective detention. Only when the number of years after introduction is larger
than the period of selective detention does the prison population decline and eventually
stabilize.
Figure 2 shows that even a relatively mild selective policy results in a considerable
increase in the number of prisoners. If the standard prison term is 2 years after three
convictions, it ultimately results in a prison population more than 6.5 times (650%) larger
than under non-selective policy. A standard prison term of 5 years causes the number of
prisoners to rise by a factor of 13, while the strictest selective policy leads to a prison
population that is 45 times as big as under prevailing policy.
6 In fact this refers to man-years. Many prison terms imposed under prevailing policy are shorter than
1 year. In these cases the terms have been aggregated: two offenders each sentenced to 6 months in prison
count as a single man-year. Imprisonment is always stated in whole years and 1 year always stands for one
person. For the total offender population in 1977, this would mean 6,833 man-years.
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If the criterion for selective detention is raised to five or ten convictions, then the prison
population increases less because each year fewer offenders meet the selection criterion.
Even so, a policy based on five previous convictions still results in an increase of between
3 and 19 times the non-selective population, depending on how long detention lasts. A
criterion of ten previous convictions results in a population of one and a half to six times
the non-selective population. It will be clear that, no matter what selective approach is
taken, selective detention of frequent offenders entails high costs.
Fig. 2 Estimated growth of the
prison population under various
forms of selective policy (in %)
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A Comparison of Costs and Benefits of Selective Detention Policy
What about the cost/benefit ratio of a selective incapacitation policy? In other words,
how efficient is such policy? This requires estimation of all costs and benefits, of say a
prison term or other punitive measure, and these costs and benefits must then valued in
comparable units, such as money. The latter presents problems in relation to criminal
policy because of the lack of consensus about how to value the benefits of crime
reductions and, to a lesser extent, the costs of prison expansion (Cohen 2005). For
instance, the costs of property offenses are sometimes based on the value of the stolen
goods, and the costs of violent offenses often include the medical costs directly arising
from the event, with a possible loss of income as the lower limit. Other measures include
damages awarded by juries (in the U.S.) and benefits paid by the victim support fund for
violent offenses (in the Netherlands) giving some degree of weight to mental and
emotional damage (Cohen and Miller 2003; Miller et al. 1993; Molenaar 2005; Rajkumar
and French 1997; Gibbons 2004). Related costs such as the loss of gainful employment
or the payment of a benefit to surviving family members must be taken into consider-
ation here.7 The costs of a growing prison population must also be included in the
calculations: new prisons will need to be built and maintained, growing numbers of
prisoners have to be provided for, and new staff needs to be hired and trained. No
precise figures are known for many of these costs.
Costs and Benefits in Relative Terms
However, without having to estimate the absolute value of a prevented conviction or the
costs of a year of imprisonment, we can set up a framework within which we can weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of any selective policy. We do this by calculating the result
for society on the basis of a relative measure: the cost/benefit ratio. The cost/benefit ratio is
a simple indication of the possible relationship between the value attributed to the yield (in
terms of convictions prevented each year) of a selective policy and the social costs (in
terms of the costs per prisoner per year). The result for society (RS) of a selective policy
can be calculated as follows:
RS ¼ ðPC  BPCÞ  ðPD  CYDÞ
where PC stands for the number of prevented convictions and BPC for the benefits per
prevented conviction. PD stands for the number of persons in detention and CYD for the
costs of a year of detention. The cost/benefit ratio (CBR) than can be stated as:8
CBR ¼ BPC=CYD
7 The detention of false positives also entails costs that are difficult to express in monetary terms.
8 Implementing the results shown in Figs. 1 and 2 in this equation reveals that for a policy meriting selective
incarceration of either two or 5 years at the third conviction to be beneficial to society, then for each
prevented conviction more than four times the costs of 1 year of detention must be saved; for longer standard
detention periods, this figure mounts up to more than eight times. Similar calculations show that even when
selection takes place after five or ten convictions, the benefits of a prevented offense must still be three to
five times higher than the costs of 1 year of detention to prevent a social loss. More on the cost/benefit ratio
in relative terms can be obtained at http://www.nscr.nl/medewerkers/pub/ablokland_pubE.php
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Costs and Benefits in Absolute Terms: Euros
We also translated the crime reduction benefits (BPC) and the incarceration costs (CYD) in
euros. For this purpose we made use of calculations made by Dutch Ministry of Justice in the
bi-annual publication on criminality and law enforcement from 2005 of Statistics Netherlands
and the Research and Documentation Center (WODC) (Molenaar 2005). Total government
expenditures on the fight against crime and on criminal law enforcement in 2004 were derived
from the final budget act and accompanying explanatory notes, the autumn budget memo-
randum, the spring budget memorandum or the ministerial budgets, when possible supple-
mented with data from annual reports of related bodies. The calculated costs of crime also
include the financial damage caused by crime to citizens, businesses and to the government
based on surveys among the population and among businesses.
These calculations must still be viewed with a good deal of reserve: much of the damage
sustained as a result of crime is difficult to express in monetary terms (e.g. emotional harm
or injury, being incapacitated for work, and so on). Moreover, only indicative figures were
available for many aspects. Further, many judicial bodies are not exclusively concerned
with crime and fighting crime, which made it difficult to calculate the costs of these
separate tasks. For example, based on estimates of the time spent on investigation activities
in contrast to prevention and safety activities only one third of the total police budget was
included. The calculated costs as well as the analyses we carried out with them must
therefore be interpreted with caution.
In calculating the benefits of selective policies, we need to make the step from actual
crime costs to convictions as observed for our sample. We accomplish this by dividing the
total yearly costs of crime in 2004 as calculated by the Dutch Ministry of Justice
(15.5 billion euro) by the total number of convictions in that year (101,980).9 This provides
us with a ‘price tag’ (107,211 euros) for each conviction that represents the benefits gained
by that conviction in terms of costs prevented. By taking the total costs of crime as a
vantage point, we take account of that behind every conviction, there is an unknown
number of unregistered offences, which will also be prevented by selectively incapacitating
a given offender—under the assumption that the number of (un)registered offences pre-
vented by means of selective incapacitation is the same for every prevented conviction
(and convicted person). We further simplify by assuming that the cost per crime does not
change with the total crime rate.10
Benefits thus refer to costs that are not incurred thanks to selective detention policy. The
costs of selective policies are prison costs. The costs of imprisoning an offender in the
Netherlands for 1 day are €190. Again we used the Ministry’s price tag (=cost price) of a
place in the prison system in 2004.11 Based on these price tags, we can calculate the costs
9 The total costs of crime include 12,617 billion euros because certain losses are prevented (in billion
euros): material loss (€4,019), fraud (€7,100), physical and emotional damages (€445), medical costs (€151)
and lost income (€902)). In addition, the 2,869 billion. euros are costs in reaction to crime: investigation and
public safety (€1733), prosecution (€411), criminal procedure (€213), enforcement of the verdict (without
detention) (€273), support to suspects (€215) and victim support (exclusive of benefit payments €24, see
Molenaar 2005) for additional information). For our analyses prison costs under prevailing policy are
excluded.
10 This may even slightly overestimate the benefits per prevented crime since some of the expenditures on
crime will be less sensitive to decreasing crime levels—e.g. a 1% drop in crime probably will not result in
the Dutch government reducing the police budget by 1%.
11 To arrive at conservative estimates we take the cheapest form of imprisonment. For example: the cost
price in judicial youth detention centers hovers around 400 euros per person per day.
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and benefits of the various policy scenarios. We have calculated the costs—for the entire
country of the Netherlands—in a year when the consequences of the policy scenarios have
stabilized (see Figs. 1 and 2).
The results—given in Table 1 in billions of euros—show that the benefits from the
selective scenarios we calculated range from 0.2 to 2.7 billion euros. A high selection rate
(a lenient definition of frequent offenders) and a high disparity ratio (a long period of
increased detention) both contribute to the benefits of selective policy. The greatest benefit
can be expected from a policy that combines the two.
The costs of a selective policy are also determined by the selection rate and disparity
ratio. The costs we have calculated for the various selective scenarios range from 0.5 bil-
lion to 14.4 billion euros and our calculations show that selective policy with a high
selection rate combined with a high disparity ratio yields the highest costs.
Since the benefits per prevented conviction (€107,211) do not much exceed the costs per
year of detention (360 · €190 = €68,400), the ultimate result for society of these selective
incapacitation policies is negative. Even a policy applying a low selection rate (strict
selection criterion of 10 convictions) combined with a low disparity ratio (standard
detention period of 2 years) still leads to a societal loss of 0.4 billion euros. The CBR based
on the Ministry of Justice calculations equals 1.6:1. The final column in Table 1 gives the
ratios needed to reach the break even point (Fig. 3). The extent to which these ratios are
different from the 1.6:1 ratio based on the actual calculations again illustrates the ineffi-
ciency of these selective policies under the current conditions. When the outcomes of our
rolling cohort method are linked to the costs of crime calculated by the Dutch Ministry of
Justice, not one of the calculated selective scenarios turns out to be socially efficient.
Sensitivity Analyses
Further Adjusting the Selection Criteria
Of course the outcomes are influenced by the assumptions made in the simulations. Therefore
to check for the sensitivity of our results, we preformed additional simulations altering these
assumptions. In relying on a count of the total number of prior conviction across the offen-
der’s entire criminal history, the above analyses pertain to selective policies that focus on cues
of persistence in offending. Selective policies relying on information on other or combina-
tions of criminal career dimensions may yield different results. Offending frequency in the
preceding period for example, may provide a selective criterion that ultimately leads to a
more efficient policy. Though criminal career dimensions are known to be correlated, that is
offenders who offend frequently and seriously also tend to have elongated criminal careers,
whether or not the use of some other criterion produces more efficient policy, remains an
empirical question.12 We therefore replicated the above analysis, but this time adding a
temporal requirement to the selective criterion, namely that the number of offenses rendering
offenders liable for selective treatment had to have had occurred in the 5 years directly
preceding the year of conviction. Results of these additional analyses are presented in Table 2
which mirrors Table 1, but for the augmented selection criteria.
As can be noticed comparing Tables 1 and 2, selective policies augmented with the
temporal requirement yield less benefits; the number of prevented convictions being lower
across all scenarios. This is due to the fact that fewer offenders meet the augmented
12 We thank a reviewer for addressing this issue.
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selection criteria; they did accumulate three ‘strikes’, but did not do so in the 5-year
window. The lower benefits of the augmented selective policies are—to some extent—
balanced by lower costs. Fewer offenders are imprisoned under these policies, lowering the
costs of imprisonment. Yet, while less so than the scenarios pertaining to all prior con-
victions, the ultimate societal result for most of the augmented selective policies comes out
negative.
Differentiating the Probability of Conviction
Our analyses—especially the cost benefits analyses—also make assumptions on the ratio of
convictions to actual crimes. In its basic form, our use of the Ministry of Justice’s cal-
culations of the total costs of crime assumes that ratio to be equal across offenders. This
however may not be the case. Frequent offenders could be argued to have a higher
probability of conviction given an offense since the police may be especially alert to their
actions and prosecutors may be more likely to bring cases against them. The reverse could
also be true. Frequent offenders may for example become more expert in committing their
crimes undetected. These and similar processes can be accounted for by adding weights to
each conviction based on offender or offence characteristics which leads to more finessed
benefit estimates being reached. Since it is unknown whether frequent offenders will
actually have committed more crimes than occasional offenders for every conviction
registered, we also estimated the benefits of each selective policy under the condition that
the probability of conviction for frequent offenders was either higher or lower than that of
non-frequent offenders. For this purpose we defined frequent offenders as offenders with
more than five prior convictions under prevailing policy in 1977.
Results of these analyses are given in Table 3 which, for each of the selective scenarios,
shows the result for society under different assumptions regarding the conviction/actual
crime-ratio for frequent and occasional offenders. The first column of Table 3 gives the
result for society under the assumption that the number of actual crimes behind every
conviction is five times higher for non-frequent offenders than for frequent offenders.
Thus, under this 1:5 assumption the probability of conviction for frequent offenders is
higher. The second column gives the ultimate result for society assuming that both frequent
and occasional offenders have the same probability of conviction given an actual crime
(given the original analyses were based on this assumption, these results are similar to
those in Table 1). The third column shows the ultimate societal result assuming the
probability of conviction for frequent offenders is five times lower than that of non-
frequent offenders. The fourth column gives the ‘break-even’ point, the ratio for which
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Fig. 3 Benefits and costs of a 3
strikes 5 year-selective policy
under different assumptions of
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also graphically illustrated in Fig. 3 for the three strikes 5 year imprisonment-scenario: as
the assumed probability of conviction for frequent offenders starts to decrease (relative to
that for occasional offenders), that is the number of actual crimes behind every conviction
starts to increase, benefits of actual crimes prevented starts to approach the total costs of
imprisonment. Under the assumption that frequent offenders commit more than seven
times as many actual crimes for each conviction than occasional offenders, the benefits of
this particular scenario equal its costs. An even greater disparity between frequent and
occasional offenders leads the selective scenario to become ultimately beneficial. How-
ever, in interpreting these results it must be kept in mind that the disparities mentioned are
relative, that is if the actual number of crimes behind every conviction for occasional
offenders is 1, that for frequent offenders is assumed to be 7. If however the actual number
of crimes behind every conviction is 10 for occasional offenders, the 1:7 ratio means that
the assumed number for frequent offenders is 70.
The first panel in Table 3 shows the results from the selective scenarios using total
criminal history as the basis of selection. For policies with a high selection rate to be
efficient the number of actual crimes behind every conviction must be large relative to that
of occasional offenders. However, for policies selectively sentencing offenders at five or 10
prior convictions to a period of 5 years imprisonment, the assumption that frequent
offenders are half as likely to be convicted given an actual crime as are occasional
offenders suffices to reach the point where benefits of prevented crimes equal prison costs.
The second panel of Table 3 reports the results for the augmented selective policies
(based on the number of convictions only in the preceding 5 years). Given that for these
policies the discrepancy in costs and benefits is smaller under the assumption of equal
conviction probabilities for frequent and occasional offenders, less disparity in conviction
probability between frequent and occasional offenders has to be assumed for these aug-
mented policies to break even.
Wastage of Prison Capacity
Finally, we examine the efficiency of selective incapacitation policies in terms of wastage of
prison capacity. The efficiency of any incapacitative policy—and especially a selective
incapacitation policy where sentence enhancement is high—is also tied to the relationship
between the length of imprisonment and the residual criminal career duration of those
incapacitated. If incapacitation extends beyond a criminal career’s termination, no inca-
pacitation effect will be achieved beyond that point. If we shift our attention to the pro-
spective part of the CCLS-data, that is to the sample’s criminal career subsequent to 1977,
we are able to estimate the accuracy of the various selective policies. To examine the
wastage of prison capacity we return to the selective scenarios presented in Figs. 1 and 2 and
Table 1 (in which selection is based on the total number of prior convictions). For these
scenarios we estimate how many offenders would be incapacitated under a selective policy
whereas in the control condition, they would accumulate no, or very few convictions.13
To answer this question, Table 4 gives the percentage of offenders—once the effects of
a selective policy have stabilized—whose incapacitation does not prevent any additional
convictions. Table 4 shows that, using a policy under which the frequent offender criterion
is set at three convictions and the standard prison term is 2 years, 68.2% of the offenders
13 As we use data on convictions, not actual crimes, the term ‘wastage’ refers only to the lack of additional
convictions.
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who would be detained on this basis must be regarded as wastage of prison capacity: no
single conviction is prevented by their detention. If three convictions are followed by a
prison term of 5 years, no convictions will be prevented in that period for 59.7% of the
selectively detained offenders. If we count offenders who would only be convicted once or
twice as wastage of prison capacity (which surely seems appropriate for the scenarios with
a long prison term), then the percentage is considerably higher.14
Table 4 Percentage of offenders (cumulative) inefficiently imprisoned per year of imprisonment under
various forms of selective policy
Year Form of selective policy
3 conv. 2 years 3 conv. 5 years 3 conv. 10 years 3 conv 20 years
1 68.2 59.7 50.0 42.0
2 81.2 64.9 53.4 44.2
3 – 70.5 56.9 46.3
4 – 76.8 61.8 49.4
5 – 87.5 66.8 52.6
10 – – 88.9 62.0
15 – – – 76.9
20 – – – 94.9
5 conv. 2 years 5 conv. 5 years 5 conv. 10 years 5 conv 20 years
1 51.0 34.6 29.6 23.9
2 74.1 43.5 36.8 28.3
3 – 54.3 39.3 30.8
4 – 66.7 44.4 34.0
5 – 77.8 50.8 38.0
10 – – 87.1 53.6
15 – – – 71.3
20 – – – 94.7
10 conv. 2 years 10 conv. 5 years 10 conv. 10 years 10 conv 20 years
1 70.4 48.9 41.9 40.8
2 82.5 50.9 41.9 40.8
3 – 53.7 41.9 40.8
4 – 66.3 44.7 43.6
5 – 77.3 52.6 50.0
10 – – 79.5 58.6
15 – – – 72.5
20 – – – 80.1
14 The percentages in Table 4 are based on offenders who would not have been imprisoned on the basis of
the offense they committed in that year under the prevailing non-selective policy, but who would have been
detained under a selective policy. This avoids having offenders who would be detained for a longer period
under the present policy being erroneously counted as false positives: after all, because they were impris-
oned, these offenders could not obtain any more convictions. Because it cannot be ruled out that, during the
total period of their selective detention, offenders would also have been detained under the non-selective
policy, the number of offenses prevented may be somewhat underestimated. It should also be noted that the
number of longer prison terms in our sample was very small.
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Wastage of prison capacity may also follow from incapacitating offenders beyond the
termination of their criminal careers. The detention of offenders who would not have been
given any further convictions—see Table 4—is already inefficient in the first year. Each
year a percentage of prisoners is added to this that spend the year in prison, whereas under
non-selective policy, they would not have been convicted again during that year. In the
second year of incapacitation under a three convictions-2 year imprisonment scenario
81.2% of the prisoners would have accumulated no further convictions if they had been
released. The wastage of prison years rises as the prison terms are longer. For example, if
three convictions are followed by a prison term of 5 years, 64.9–87.5% are wastefully
imprisoned in the second and 5th year of their sentence respectively. Under a selective
approach for frequent offenders, a great many people are detained well beyond the ter-
mination of their criminal career. This leads to an inefficient utilization of the detention
capacity.
A comparison of the columns in Table 4 shows that the greater the disparity ratio, the
smaller the number of false positives. This is partly due to the fact that when policy is
stricter, many offenders have already been put away by the selective policy. But more
importantly, the period for which the number of convictions is calculated becomes longer
as the prison term increases. So on balance, there are fewer offenders who stay unconvicted
for the full 20 years than there are offenders who do so the first two or 5 years after their
detention on the basis of the criterion.
A comparison across the rows shows that a policy scenario that works with a criterion of
five convictions, gives a better result than selection after three convictions. An even stricter
selection rate of 10 convictions leads again to more prison wastage. This seems primarily
to be caused by an aging-out effect: the average age of offenders who meet such a strict
criterion is higher (34 years compared to 28 and 29 years under a policy of three and five
convictions respectively). It takes more time to build up such a criminal history. This again
increases the chance that at the moment of selective detention, their criminal behavior
already exhibits a downward trend.
Conclusion
Increasingly there have been calls for a targeted approach to frequent offenders in recent
years and several countries—following the example of the U.S.—have implemented
selective incapacitation policies. This is done even though the possible consequences of
such measures are far from clear. The aim of this paper was to obtain more insight into the
possible incapacitation effects of selectively imprisoning frequent offenders in the Neth-
erlands.
The conclusions on the incapacitative effect of selective policies are clear. Selectively
incapacitating presumed frequent offenders on the basis of the number of offenses they
have committed in the past—or in the preceding 5 years—leads to a substantial decline in
crime. This decline is the greatest in the first years after the introduction of the selective
policy as a rising share of offenders are selectively imprisoned. After some time,
depending on the duration of the standard prison term, some of the offenders having
completed their prison term rejoin the population, thus causing crime to rise again. The
ultimate result of our simulations—assuming only incapacitatative effects—is a 25% de-
crease in crime under the strictest regime. However, these benefits are offset by the fact
that the introduction of a selective policy causes the prison population to rise considerably;
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up to 45 times the population under prevailing non-selective policy for a very strict
selective regime. As a result, if a selective policy based on the total number of prior
convictions is to be efficient, the average conviction prevented by the selective incapaci-
tation of frequent offenders would have to generate four to eight times as much in benefits
than it would cost detaining an offender for 1 year.
On the basis of the total crime costs for 2004, however, the benefits from preventing an
average conviction are only approximately twice as high as the costs of 1 year of prison.
Under the assumption of equal probability of conviction across all offenders this would
mean that even the selective incapacitation scenario with the most favorable CBR (five
prior convictions in the entire criminal history, 5 years of prison) is only efficient if the
costs per prisoner can be reduced from 190 to 58 euros per day, which cannot be con-
sidered a realistic option. Allowing disparity in the probability of conviction however,
may—at current prison costs—result in a break even situation for some selective policies if
frequent offenders are less than half as likely as non-frequent offenders to be convicted
given an actual crime.
Finally, risk estimation merely on the basis of criminal past generates high wastage of
prison capacity. A lower selection rate (employing a stricter selection criterion) reduces
this problem, but the resulting policy has hardly any added crime reduction value over
prevailing non-selective policy.
In conclusion, a few further comments should be made. First, our analyses focus only on
the incapacitative effect of selective policies and do not take into account general or specific
deterrent effects. If these effects are large, selective policies may prove much more beneficial.
However, our simulation did not include the possible criminogenic influence of imprisonment
either. The prime objective of a selective detention policy is the safety of society; re-
socialization of offenders has low priority. Developmental criminological research raises
serious doubts about the continuity in offense behavior which is at the heart of selective
policy. The behavior of frequent offender is not free from external influences, and these
influences may inhibit crime, but they may also increase the chances of a subsequent offense.
The CCLS has already shown that previous criminal behavior increases the probability of
criminal behavior later in life; to what extent detention has an effect is a matter currently under
investigation (Nieuwbeerta et al. 2004). If imprisonment does turn out to have a criminogenic
effect, this may cancel out the effect of a selective policy in full or in part, because under a
selective policy offenders are detained who would not have been sentenced to a prison term
under a non-selective policy. In that case, only a selective policy that entails a very long prison
term would lead to a decline in crime (which raises the question of how many penal insti-
tutions we would need to build to accommodate all these prisoners).
Second, the current focus on incapacitative effects may explain some of the differences
in elasticity—the percentage of crime reduction given a 1% increase of the prison popu-
lation—compared with earlier macro-level studies. Our simulation filtered out any
behavioral or system effects that may have affected earlier results. For example, benefits
from U.S. Three Strikes laws have fallen below expectation, at least partly due to judges
balking at sentencing offenders under these new policies (Clark et al. 1997).
Additionally, differences between the U.S. and the Netherlands in crime and prison
rates as well as in the fraction of convicted offenders sentenced to prison and the average
sentence length served under non-selective policy, may have account for our results. A
recent report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Farrington et al. 2004) comparing trends
in crime rates and severity of punishment across the U.S., the Netherlands and several other
European countries showed for instance that in 1981 the burglary rate in the US to be more
than double that of the Netherlands while the incarceration rate (for burglary) was about
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1.3 times as high. Percent of convicted offenders sentenced to prison were 54% for the U.S.
and 90% for the Netherlands, the average sentence length in the U.S. was 37 months
compared to 13 months in the Netherlands—17 versus 11 months when measuring only
time actually served. Similar patterns were found for other types of offences. In general,
the absolute number of prisoners in the Netherlands being low compared to the U.S. means
that a relative increase in the Dutch prison population involves fewer prisoners in terms of
absolute numbers. Furthermore, the impact of selective policies is mediated by the fraction
of convictees that were already sent to prison under non-selective policy. While this
fraction appears to be somewhat higher in the Netherlands,15 this is offset by the relatively
lenient sentencing policy in the Netherlands.16 In our data the average prison term under
prevailing Dutch non-selective policy averages below 100 days for those actually sen-
tenced to prison in 1977. Even a mandatory prison term of 2 years thus leads to great
sanction disparity (i.e. a sevenfold increase in sentence length) among frequent offenders
under the selective versus the non-selective scenario, which in turn explains the steep rise
in prison costs under selective scenarios. Our results are comparable to those of Andersson
(1993) who, conducting simulations on Swedish birth-cohort data, found that a mandatory
prison term of 2 years following every second conviction led the prison population to
increase with a fivefold.
A final remark in respect of the analyses is to what extent data from 1977 can be
generalized to draw conclusions about our present day and age. The primary object of the
Criminal Career and Life Course Study is to chart the way criminal behavior develops in
the course of a person’s life. To do this properly, a long follow-up period is required, which
is why we opted for a cohort from 1977. The rolling cohorts method used here makes the
assumption that the composition of the successive cohorts remains the same. This is most
likely not the case in practice. For instance, only a very small number of offenders were
regarded as drug addicts in 1977, and the social composition of the group of offenders was
different than it is today. On the other hand, a recent report by the Dutch Ministry of
Justice on recidivism in the 1997 to 2003 conviction cohorts (Wartna and Tollenaar 2006)
shows these cohorts to be highly comparable to the 1977-cohort used here, both in criminal
histories and recidivism rates, suggesting the distribution of offending may not differ very
much over time. Still, we recommend that the analyses reported here be replicated in
relation to the expected decrease in registered crime and the expected growth in the prison
population using data from a more recent cohort. However, to determine the proportion of
false positives, prospective recidivist data covering a longer period—and thus from an
older cohort—are indispensable.17
15 Note however that the BJS-report mentions the percentage of offenders found guilty by a judge who were
incarcerated. In the current study ‘convictions’ were defined as both guilty verdicts and policy waivers. In so
far the Dutch public prosecutor is more likely to waive criminal cases for policy reasons, the percentage of
‘convicted’ offenders may come closer or even drop below that of the U.S.
16 While burglary rates in the U.S. have increasingly become similar to those in the Netherlands, the
difference in sentence length remains.
17 It must be remarked that the analyses do not connect seamlessly to present Dutch practice. The ISD
defines the repeat offender as an offender with three convictions, but sets the further condition that this must
have happened in the past 5 years. The latter is to avoid the selective detention, on the basis of this act, of
offenders with a long criminal career behind them, but a low frequency of offenses. No such condition was
set for our analyses, nor was it by the American three-strikes legislation; this might have a negative effect on
the efficiency calculated of the various penal scenarios. Analyses of the conviction density, the number of
convictions per year, do actually show a strong correlation between conviction density and length of the
criminal career for the group of people studied here. In this respect, the outcomes of the scenario studies
conducted for this paper will therefore not differ much from the practical outcomes of present policy.
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Lastly, we would like to reflect on the implications of our research results. Selectively
incapacitating offenders on the basis of an estimation of their future behavior rooted in
their past criminal behavior points to the growing influence of risk-oriented thinking in
criminal legislation and judicial policy (Feely and Simon 1992). Frequent offenders belong
to the category of offenders with a high risk of recidivism, and society thinks that they
therefore ought to be removed from its midst. Offenders with a sufficiently extensive
criminal history are thus penalized not for what they have done, but for what they are
expected to do in the future. This implies that a prison term is converted from a punitive
into a preventive measure, one that our results suggest is used unnecessarily in many cases.
Moreover, under a selective policy, there is no longer any relationship between the offense
committed and the duration of the sentence. Selective incapacitation conflicts with a
number of fundamental principles of the Dutch criminal law system. On the basis of our
research results, which were mainly negative about the selective detention of frequent
offenders, one may well wonder whether such a fundamental change to the Dutch criminal
law system is actually opportune, and even whether this policy has any empirical legiti-
macy. It is possible and even likely that criminological research would point to other policy
alternatives, primarily those that do find support in criminological research (Donohue III
and Siegelman 1998), as a more obvious choice—for example, investing more in the socio-
economic functioning of prisoners by improving and expanding the probation and after-
care service.
Acknowledgments We would like to thank the editors of the special issue and three anonymous reviewers
for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
References
Andersson J (1993) A longitudinal simulation study of incapacitation effects (Project Metropolitan no. 35).
Department of Sociology, University of Stockholm, Stockholm
Austin J, Irwin J (2001) It’s about time: America’s imprisonment binge. Wadsworth, Belmont, CA
Avi-Itzhak B, Shinnar R (1973) Quantitative models in crime control. J Crim Justice 1:185–217
Barnett A, Lofaso AJ (1985) Selective incapacitation and the Philadelphia cohort data. J Quant Crimin
1(1):3–36
Bernard TJ, Ritti RR (1991) The Philadelphia birth cohort and selective incapacitation. J Res Crime Delinq
28(1):33–54
Block CR, Werff Cvd (1991) Initiation and continuation of a criminal career: who are the most active and
dangerous offenders in the Netherlands (105). WODC, Ministerie van Justitie, Den Haag
Blokland AAJ (2005) Crime over the lifespan; trajectories of criminal behavior in Dutch offenders. NSCR,
Leiden
Blokland AAJ, Nagin DS, Nieuwbeerta P (2005) Life span offending trajectories of a Dutch conviction
cohort. Criminology 43(4):919–954
Blokland AAJ, Nieuwbeerta P (2005) The effects of life circumstances on longitudinal trajectories of
offending. Criminology 43(4):1203–1240
Blumstein A (2005) An over view of the symposium and some next steps. Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci
602:242–258
Blumstein A, Cohen J, Nagin DS (eds) (1978) Deterrence and incapacitation: estimating the effects of
criminal sanctions on crime rates. National academy of Sciences, Washington, DC
Blumstein A, Cohen J, Farrington DP (1988) Criminal career research: its value for criminology. Crimi-
nology 26(1):1–35
Blumstein A, Canela-Cacho JA, Cohen J (1993) Filtered sampling from populations with heterogeneous
event frequencies. Manage Sci 39:886–899
Canela-Cacho JA, Blumstein A, Chohen J (1997) Relationship between the offending frequency (k) of
imprisoned and free offenders. Criminology 35(1):133–175
J Quant Criminol (2007) 23:327–353 351
123
Clark J, Austin J, Henry DA (1997) ‘‘Three strikes and you’re out’’: a review of state legislation. National
Institute of Justice, Washington, DC
Cohen J (1978) The incapacitative effect of imprisonment: a critical review of the literature. In: Blumstein
A, Cohen J, Nagin D (eds) Deterrence and incapacitation: estimating the effects of criminal sanctions
on crime rates. National academy of Sciences, Washington, DC
Cohen MA (2005) The costs of crime and justice. Routledge, London
Cohen MA, Miller TR (2003) Willingness to award. Nonmonetary damages and the implied value of life
from jury awards. Int Rev Law Econ 23(2):165–181
Cushman RC (1996) Effects on a local criminal justice system. In: Sechrest DK (ed) Three strikes and
you’re out: vengenace as a public policy. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
DiIulio JJ, Piehl AM (1991) Does prison pay? The stormy national debate over the cost-effectiveness of
imprisonment. Brook Rev, 28–35
Donohue JJ III, Siegelman P (1998) Allocating resources among prisons and social programs in the battle
against crime. J Legal Stud 27:1–43
Farrington DP, Langan PA, Tonry M (2004) Cross-national studies in crime and justice. http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cnscj.pdf
Feely MM, Simon J (1992) The new penology: notes on emerging strategy of corrections and its impli-
cations. Criminology 30:449–474
Flanagan TJ, Marquart JW, Adams KG (1998) Incarcerating criminals: prisons and ails in social and
organizational context. Oxford, New York
Gibbons S (2004) The cost of urban property crime. Econ J 114:441–463
Grapendaal M, Tilburg Wv (2002) Veelplegers in Netherland. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 44(3):214–230
Greenwood PW, Abrahamse AF (1982) Selective incapacitation. RAND, Santa Monica, CA
Kempf-Leonard K, Tracy PE, Howell JC (2001) Serious, violent and chronic juvenile offenders: the rela-
tionship of delinquency career type to adult criminality. Justice Q 18:449–478
King RS, Mauer M (2001) Aging behind bars: three strikes seven years later. The Sentencing Project,
Washington, DC
Kommer MM (1994) Het Nederlandse strafklimaat in internationaal perspectief. In: Moerings M (ed) Hoe
Punitief is Nederland? Gouda-Quint, Arnhem
Kovandzic TV (2001) The impact of Florida’s habitual offender law on crime. Criminology 39(1):179–203
Kovandzic TV, Sloan JJ III, Vieraitis LM (2002) Unintended consequences of politically popular sentencing
policy: the homicide promoting effects of ‘Three strikes’ in U.S. cities (1980–1999). Criminol Public
Policy 1(3):399–424
Levitt SD (1996) The effect of prison population size on crime rates: evidence from prison overcrowding
litigation. Q J Econ 111:319–351
Marvell TB, Moody CE (2001) The lethal effects of three-strikes laws. J Legal Stud XXX(January):89–106
Mathiesen T (1998) Selective incapacitation revisited. Law Hum behav 22(4):455–476
Miles T, Ludwig J (2007) The silence of the lambdas: deterring incapacitation research. J Quant Criminol,
this issue
Miller TR, Cohen MA, Rossman SB (1993) Victim costs of crime and resulting injuries. Health Aff
12(4):186–197
Moffitt TE (1993) Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: a developmental
taxonomy. Psychol Rev 100(4):674–701
Moffitt TE (2006) A review of research on the taxonomy of life-course persistent versus adolescence-limited
antisocial behavior. In: Cullen FT, Wright JP, Blevins KR (eds) Taking stock: the of criminological
theory, vol 15. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, pp 277–311
Molenaar DEG (2005) Uitgaven aan criminaliteit. In: Heide Wvd (ed) Criminaliteit en Rechtshandhaving
2004. WODC, Den Haag, pp 211–243
Moore MH (1986) Purblind justice: normative issues in the use of predictive or discriminating tests in the
criminal justice system. In: Blumstein A, Cohen J, Roth JA, Visher CA (eds) Criminal careers and
‘career criminals’, vol 2. National academy Press, Washington, DC, pp 314–335
Nieuwbeerta P, Blokland AAJ (2003) Criminal careers of adult Dutch offenders. Codebook and docu-
mentation. NSCR, Leiden
Nieuwbeerta P, Blokland AAJ, Wittebrood K (2004) Eens crimineel, altijd crimineel? Een toetsing van
‘kinds of people’ en ‘kinds of context’ verklaringen voor de ontwikkeling van criminele carrieres.
Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 46(3):210–232
Patch PC (1998) The three strikes law and control of crime in California. ACJS Today 17:1–4
Piehl AM, DiIulio JJ (1995) Does prison pay? Revisited: returning to the crime scene. Brook Rev 20–25
Piper ES (1985) Violent recidivism and chronicity in the 1958 Philadeliphia cohort. J Quant Criminol
1(4):319–344
352 J Quant Criminol (2007) 23:327–353
123
Piquero AR (2000a) Assessing the relationships between gender, chronicity, seriousness, and offense
skewness in criminal offending. J Crim Justice 28:103–115
Piquero AR (2000b) Frequency, specialization, and violence in offending careers. J Res Crime Delinq
37(4):392–418
Piquero AR, Blumstein A (2007) Does incapacitation reduce crime. J Quant Criminol, this issue
Rajkumar AS, French MT (1997) Drug abuse, crime costs, and the economic benefits of treatment. J Quant
Criminol 13(3):291–323
Shafer JR (1999) The deterrent effects of three-strikes law. FBI Law Enforce Bull 68:6–10
Shepherd JM (2002) Fear of the first strike: the full deterrent effect of California’s two- and three-strikes
legislation. J Legal Stud XXXI(January):159–201
Shichor D, Sechrest DK (1996) Three strikes as public policy: future implications. In: Sechrest DK (ed)
Three strikes and you’re out: vengenace as a public policy. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
Smit PR (2001) Nederland in internationaal perspectief. In: Huls FWM, Schreuders MM, Ter Horst-Van
Breukelen MH, van Tulder FP (eds) Criminaliteit en Rechtshandhaving 2000. WODC, Den Haaf
Spelman W (1994) Criminal incapacitation. Plenum Press, New York
Spelman W (2000a) What recent studies do (and don’t) tell us about imprisonment and crime. Crime Justice
27:419–494
Spelman W (2000b) The limited importance of prison expansion. In: Blumstein A, Wallman J (eds) The
crime drop in America. Cambridge university Press, Cambridge
Spelman W (2005) Jobs or jails? The crime drop in Texas. J Policy Anal Manage 24(1):133–165
Stemen D (2007) Reconsidering incarceration: new directions for reducing crime. Vera Institute of Justice,
New York
Tracy PE, Wolfgang ME, Figlio RM (1990) Delinquency careers in two birth cohorts. Plenum Press, New
York
Versteegh P, Janssen J, Bernasco W (2003) Beginners, doorstromers en veelplegers – carrie`re criminaliteit
in de politieregio Haaglanden. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 45(2):127–139
Vitiello M (1997) Three strikes: can we return to rationality? J Crim Law Criminol 87:395–481
Walker S (2001) Sense and nonesense about crime and drugs: a policy guide. Wadsworth, Belmont, CA
Wartna BSJ, Tollenaar N (2006) Recidive 1997–2003. Ontwikkelingen in het niveau van de strafrechtelijke
recidive van jeugdige en volwassen daders. WODC, Den Haag
Wittebrood K (2006) Slachtoffers van Criminaliteit. SCP, Den Haag
Wolfgang M, Figlio R, Sellin T (1972) Delinquency in a birth cohort. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Zimring FE, Hawkins G (1995) Incapacitation: penal confinement and the restraint of crime. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York
Zimring FE, Hawkins G, Kamin S (2001) Punishment and democray: three strikes and you’re out in
California. Oxford University Press, New York
J Quant Criminol (2007) 23:327–353 353
123
